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Other Reasonable Inferences Exist? An 
Examination of the Use of Circumstantial 
Evidence to Prove Inducement of 
Infringement 
Roy D. Gross* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the type of evidence that can be used 
to prove if an alleged infringer is liable for inducement of 
infringement. Specifically, this article focuses on examining 
whether an inference based on circumstantial evidence can 
show whether the alleged infringer has the requisite state of 
mind to induce infringement and compares inferences and 
intent to induce infringement against intent in other areas of 
patent law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An individual or corporation may infringe a valid U.S. 
Patent if the actions of the individual or corporation satisfy any 
of the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271.1 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 2 
Satisfying the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) is known as 
“direct infringement.” 
In various instances, an individual or corporation does not 
make, use, sell, or offer to sell the patented invention, but 
rather encourages or induces others to make, use, sell, or offer 
to sell the patented invention. In these instances, the 
individual or corporation may still be liable for infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), even though the individual or 
corporation does not directly infringe the patented invention.3 
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) provides that “[w]hoever actively induces 
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”4 
Inducement of infringement requires that there be a showing of 
                                                          
 1. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., id. 
 4. Id. 
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an underlying act of direct infringement.5 
In the context of patent litigation, recent Federal Circuit 
and Supreme Court opinions have analyzed claims for 
inducement of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).6 These 
opinions explain that an alleged infringer must have “specific 
intent” to induce infringement in order to be liable as an 
inducer. 7 
“Specific intent” as articulated in DSU Medical Corp. v. 
JMS Co., a 2006 en banc decision of the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals, requires that in order to be liable as an inducer of 
infringement, an alleged infringer must have “an affirmative 
intent to cause direct infringement.”8 To meet this standard, 
“evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s 
infringement” must be proven.9 
Evidence of culpable conduct may either be direct evidence 
or indirect evidence.10 In instances where direct evidence of 
culpable conduct is relied on to prove specific intent, it is 
straightforward to conclude that an alleged infringer had the 
requisite state of mind to induce infringement. In instances 
when circumstantial evidence is used, it is difficult to prove 
that an alleged inducer had the specific intent to cause direct  
 
 
                                                          
 5. See, e.g., Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] finding of inducement requires a threshold finding of 
direct infringement—either a finding of specific instances of direct 
infringement or a finding that the accused products necessarily infringe.”); see 
also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 6. See Akamai Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 
F.3d 1010, 1024–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 
F.3d 1317, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ricoh Co., 550 F.3d at 1342–43; DSU 
Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 7. See, e.g., DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306; see also Global-Tech Appliances 
Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2011). 
 8. DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306 (“It must be established that the 
defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement and 
not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute 
inducement.”). 
 9. Id. at 1306 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005)); see also Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 
Inc. 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 10. See, e.g., DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306 (“While proof of intent is 
necessary, direct evidence is not required; rather, circumstantial evidence may 
suffice.” (quoting Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d. 660, 668 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988))). 
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infringement because the circumstantial evidence must be used 
to draw an inference to the alleged inducer’s state of mind.11 
This Article examines the intent doctrine for inducement of 
infringement and the use of circumstantial evidence to prove 
specific intent. Part I of this Article examines the current state 
of the law of inducement of infringement in light of recent 
Federal Circuit opinions. Part II provides a brief overview of 
the history of the doctrine of specific intent to induce 
infringement. Part III reviews intent in other patent law 
doctrines. Part IV of this Article provides suggestions to modify 
the current standard of specific intent to induce infringement, 
so that it is harmonized with other areas of patent law. Part V 
offers a brief conclusion. 
I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW OF INDUCEMENT 
A. DSU MEDICAL CORP. V. JMS CO. (EN BANC DECISION) 
In 2006, the Federal Circuit analyzed the doctrine of intent 
to induce infringement in its en banc decision, DSU Medical 
Corp. v. JMS Co.12 In this landmark decision, the Federal 
Circuit determined that an alleged infringer, in the context of 
induced infringement, must have “the required intent . . . to 
induce the specific acts of [infringement] or additionally to 
cause an infringement.”13 DSU resolved conflicting lines of 
precedent regarding the intent requirement to show 
inducement.14 
In doing so, DSU clarified that intent in the context of 
inducement of infringement requires that “the inducer must 
                                                          
 11. See, e.g., id. at 1305–06 (“Grokster, thus, validates this court’s 
articulation of the state of mind requirement for inducement.”); see also 
Richard J. Stark & Andrei Harasymiak, Inducement of Patent Infringement: 
The Intent Standard and Circumstantial Evidence of Intent, in INSIDE THE 
MINDS: RECENT TRENDS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS 111, 137–40 
(2011). 
 12. See, DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1304–06. 
 13. Id. at 1304 (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi 
Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 14. See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 
420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the lack of clarity in the 
standard); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (discussing how actual intent is needed); Manville Sales Corp., 917 
F.2d at 553 (stating that the plaintiff has to show “defendant possessed 
specific intent to encourage another’s infringement”). 
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have an affirmative intent to cause direct infringement . . . .”15 
Proving affirmative intent involves establishing “evidence of 
culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s 
infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the 
direct infringer’s activities.”16 
While DSU clarified the standard for inducement of 
infringement, post-DSU courts have struggled with analyzing 
the type of evidence (direct or circumstantial) that can be relied 
on to show intent through culpable conduct directed to 
encouraging another’s infringement. This has resulted in 
inconsistent outcomes for determining whether an alleged 
inducer of infringement had the affirmative intent to encourage 
another’s infringement. Recent cases finding no affirmative 
intent to induce infringement are analyzed in Part I.B.1, while 
cases finding affirmative intent to induce infringement are 
analyzed in Part I.B.2. 
B. POST-DSU CASES 
1. Court Found No Affirmative Intent to Induce Infringement 
In Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc., 
plaintiff Kinetic Concepts alleged that defendant Blue Sky 
Medical Group induced direct infringement of a patent directed 
to a method for treating a wound by applying suction.17 The 
plaintiff argued that Blue Sky had the affirmative intent to 
induce infringement of the patented method by selling kits 
including a pump and product manuals containing instructions 
to use the pump.18 The product manuals were argued to be 
evidence of Blue Sky’s affirmative intent to induce 
infringement.19 
The Federal Circuit considered this evidence and 
testimonial evidence from Blue Sky’s principals that Blue Sky 
believed that its product performed a method in the public 
domain and thus it did not have the intent to induce 
infringement.20 The Federal Circuit relied on the testimonial 
evidence and did not draw an inference that Blue Sky had the 
                                                          
 15. DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306 (emphasis added). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 18. Id. at 1023. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1024–25. 
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specific intent to induce infringement as the Federal Circuit 
held that in this case “the intent required for induced 
infringement was lacking.”21 
In another Federal Circuit opinion, Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic 
Holding, Inc., plaintiff Vita-Mix alleged that defendant Basic 
Holding induced infringement of a patent directed to a method 
for preventing the formation of an air pocket in a food 
blender.22 Vita-Mix argued that because Basic Holding sold a 
blender with a set of instructions that allegedly taught the 
patented method, Basic Holding had the affirmative intent to 
induce infringement.23 
The Federal Circuit disagreed and held that the 
instructions, and a second set of amended instructions, 
provided no basis on which the plaintiff could rely to infer 
specific intent to encourage infringement.24 In Vita-Mix, the 
court found “the record is devoid of direct or circumstantial 
evidence that [defendant] intends to encourage infringement by 
its customers, and replete with evidence to the contrary” as the 
instructions sold with the blender undisputedly taught non-
infringing uses, evidencing intent to discourage infringement.25 
The court, thus, did not rely on the evidence to infer specific 
intent to encourage infringement.26 
In Ecolab Inc. v. FMC Corp., the plaintiff FMC argued that 
defendant Ecolab induced infringement of a patented invention 
                                                          
 21. Id. at 1025 (“[T]he jury heard Blue Sky’s founders explain why they 
did not believe they were infringing and had the opportunity to assess their 
credibility. We find no basis to overturn the jury’s decision with respect to 
inducement.”). 
 22. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328–29 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
 23. Id. at 1328–29. 
 24. Id. (“[T]he record is devoid of actual evidence establishing specific 
intent to encourage customers to infringe the ‘021 patent.”). 
 25. Id. at 1329 (“The original product instructions do not evidence a 
specific intent to encourage infringement, since they teach a stirring action 
which [defendant] could have reasonably believed was non-infringing. The 
amended product instructions teach an undisputedly non-infringing use, 
evidencing intent to discourage infringement. Thus, [defendant’s] product 
instructions provide no basis on which Vita-Mix can rely to infer specific 
intent to encourage infringement.”). 
 26. Id. at 1329 n.2 (“The question is not, however, whether a user 
following the instructions may end up using the device in an infringing way. 
Rather, it is whether [the defendant’s] instructions teach an infringing use of 
the device such that we are willing to infer from those instructions an 
affirmative intent to infringe the patent.”). 
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directed to methods for applying a chemical alone or in  
combination with other peracids directly to meat products to 
reduce microbial populations on the meat surface.27 
The Federal Circuit found that defendant Ecolab’s 
personnel reasonably believed that the method claims did not 
cover defendant’s product because the defendant’s product 
contained the same combination of antimicrobial agents as 
disclosed in the prior art.28 Thus, even though the product was 
ultimately found to infringe the patent, the Federal Circuit 
relied on evidence that the defendant’s product contained the 
same combination of antimicrobial agents as disclosed in the 
prior art as substantial evidence to conclude that the defendant 
believed it was practicing the prior art and thus did not have 
the intent to induce infringement.29 
While the Federal Circuit applied DSU in the above cases 
to find no intent to induce infringement, the Federal Circuit 
reached the opposite result in the post-DSU cases found in Part 
I.B.2. 
2. Court Found Affirmative Intent to Induce Infringement 
In AstraZeneca L.P. v. Apotex, Inc., the plaintiff 
AstraZeneca alleged that the defendant Apotex had the 
affirmative intent to induce infringement of a patent directed 
to a method of administering a nebulized budesonide inhalation 
suspension once a day.30 Prior to the lawsuit to receive FDA 
approval, the defendant Apotex filed an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) for its nebulized budesonide inhalation 
suspension product and carved out all references to 
administration of once daily dosing from its package insert in 
an effort to obtain FDA approval and avoid the patented 
method.31 
                                                          
 27. Ecolab Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 28. Id. at 1351 (“[T]he jury could have reasonably concluded that 
[defendant] lacked the intent required for induced infringement . . . because 
Inspexx contains a synergistic combination of three antimicrobial agents, and 
thus does not ‘consist essentially of’ [peroxyacetic acid] . . . [and] Ecolab 
personnel reasonably believed that the ‘676 patent did not cover Inspexx 
because Inspexx contains the same combination of antimicrobial agents 
disclosed in the prior art Oakes patent.”). 
 29. Id. at 1351 ( “[T]he jury had substantial evidence from which it could 
have reasonably concluded that Ecolab did not induce infringement because it 
lacked the required intent.”). 
 30. AstraZeneca L.P. v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 31. Id. at 1047. 
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Despite Apotex’s efforts in its carve out, AstraZeneca 
alleged that Apotex’s package insert included instructions 
containing “titrate down” language, so that users of Apotex’s 
product would understand to titrate down to a dosing regimen 
of once a day, thus infringing the patented method.32 
AstraZeneca argued that the “titrate down” language was 
evidence that Apotex had the intent to induce infringement of 
the patented method.33 
In a preliminary injunction proceeding, the district court 
found that Apotex had the affirmative intent to induce 
infringement of the patented method by drawing an inference 
based on Apotex’s intent in including this “titrate down” 
language in the package insert.34 The district court found that 
there was no evidence in the record that Apotex had attempted 
to craft a non-infringing label and thus found that Apotex had 
the specific intent to induce infringement.35 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding 
that “despite being aware of the infringement problem 
presented by the proposed label, Apotex nonetheless proceeded 
with its plans to distribute the generic drug product.”36 The 
Federal Circuit found that the “titrate down” language was 
sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer Apotex’s intent to 
induce infringement of the patented method.37 
In Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., the claimed 
invention was a method directed to a specific write strategy for 
making legible marks on phase-change optical discs by using 
optical drives.38 The defendant Quanta sold optical drives with 
software that allegedly performed the claimed method.39 The 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 1056–58. 
 33. Id. at 1057 (arguing that Apotex’s proposed label would induce 
consumers to infringe the asserted method claims because the label implicitly 
instructed users to administer the generic drug once daily). 
 34. Id. at 1047–49. 
 35. Id. at 1049. 
 36. Id. at 1060 (finding that the district court’s specific intent finding was 
not based solely on the proposed label, but also on Apotex’s decision to proceed 
with its plan to distribute the drug despite being aware that the label 
presented infringement problems). 
 37. Id. at 1060 (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco., Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 
668 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 38. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 39. Id. at 1330. 
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plaintiff Ricoh alleged that the only function of the software 
sold by Quanta was to instruct the drives to perform the 
patented methods and thus, Quanta induced infringement of 
Ricoh’s patents, as it instructed infringers to perform acts of 
direct infringement.40 
The Federal Circuit held that it was a question of fact 
whether the drives and software sold by Quanta had a purpose 
other than the performance of infringing functions under 
normal use conditions and remanded the inducement claim 
back to the district court.41 
Thus, as discussed supra, post-DSU cases have had 
inconsistent results with determining intent to induce 
infringement. This is because evidence relied upon to show 
intent to induce infringement is typically circumstantial 
evidence and courts have interpreted circumstantial evidence 
to draw various inferences, sometimes inferring intent and 
sometimes not. An analysis of the use of circumstantial 
evidence to infer intent is analyzed infra. 
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC INTENT TO  
INDUCE INFRINGEMENT 
The doctrine that circumstantial evidence can be used to 
prove intent was first established in a personal injury case, 
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc.42 Using circumstantial 
evidence to prove specific intent to induce infringement in 
patent law evolved from Michalic and through several 
subsequent cases, which are analyzed below. 
A. MICHALIC V. CLEVELAND TANKERS, INC. 
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. was a personal injury 
case where the plaintiff alleged that a 2.5 pound wrench 
dropped on his toe during his use of the wrench while at 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 1343. 
 41. Id. at 1342–44 (“[The District C]ourt erred in discounting evidence 
that [Quanta] made a presentation to Dell, which touted the advantages of the 
Quanta drives, on the grounds that the presentation disclosed an algorithm 
rather than one of the claimed methods. The potential relevance of the 
presentation is two-fold. First, the presentation is relevant to the extent it 
indicates [Quanta] possessed the requisite intent that its drives be used to 
perform the infringing methods. Second, the presentation is relevant to the 
issue of whether it encouraged Dell to use the drives in an infringing 
manner.”). 
 42. Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960). 
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work.43 During trial, testimony was provided that the jaw of 
the wrench repeatedly slipped from the nuts and had play in 
it.44 Based on this testimony, the plaintiff alleged that the 
wrench was defective, leading to the conclusion that the 
defendant was negligent in having a defective wrench at the job 
site.45 
The Supreme Court used the circumstantial evidence 
provided through witness testimony to infer that there was 
play in the wrench and thus the defendant was negligent, even 
though direct evidence of play in the wrench was not 
established by the plaintiff.46 The Supreme Court held that 
“[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also 
be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct 
evidence,” thus, establishing the use of circumstantial evidence 
to prove culpability.47 
B. MOLECULON RESEARCH CORP. V. CBS, INC. 
Circumstantial evidence was incorporated into patent law 
in 1986 in Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.48 In 
Moleculon, the patented invention was directed to method 
claims for making a Rubik’s Cube.49 The alleged infringer sold 
a Rubik’s Cube in pieces with an instruction sheet to put the 
Rubik’s Cube together.50 The alleged infringer argued that 
there was no evidence of direct infringement of the method 
claims and thus no liability for the alleged infringer.51 
The district court disagreed and held that the 
circumstantial evidence of the Rubik’s Cube puzzle sales and 
dissemination of an instruction sheet showed intent sufficient 
to support a finding of inducement of infringement.52 This 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 330–31. 
 44. Id. at 330. 
 45. Id. at 330–31. 
 46. Id. at 330 (holding that “there was no direct evidence of play in the 
jaw of the wrench . . . [b]ut direct evidence of a fact is not required.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1263–64. 
 51. Id. at 1272. 
 52. Id. (relying on circumstantial evidence of extensive puzzle sales, 
dissemination of an instruction sheet teaching the method of restoring the 
preselected pattern with each puzzle, and the availability of a solution booklet 
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finding was upheld by the Federal Circuit which stated that 
evidence of the Rubik’s Cube puzzle sales and dissemination of 
an instruction sheet provided the necessary circumstantial 
evidence to prove that the alleged inducer had specific intent to 
induce infringement.53 
Thus, the court in Moleculon held that direct evidence of a 
fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is 
sufficient to prove that an inducer has the intent to induce 
infringement.54 Moleculon affirmed the holding in Michalic 
that “circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may 
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct 
evidence.”55 
C. WATER TECHNOLOGIES CORP. V. CALCO, LTD. 
Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd. upheld and further 
developed the circumstantial evidence doctrine in patent law 
established in Moleculon.56 In Water Technologies, an alleged 
inducer gave infringing resins to a third party.57 The alleged 
inducer argued that he had a subjective belief that he had 
noninfringing resins, and thus, a finding of intent should be 
negated by his subjective belief that there was no 
infringement.58 
The district court disagreed and found that there was 
sufficient evidence to infer intent. The district court relied on 
circumstantial evidence that the alleged inducer provided the 
resin formulas to a direct infringer, helped the direct infringer 
make the resins by controlling the direct infringer’s 
manufacture of the resins. The alleged inducer also prepared 
consumer use instructions.59 The district court used this 
circumstantial evidence to infer that the alleged inducer had 
the requisite intent to induce infringement.60 
                                                          
on how to solve the puzzle). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. It is significant to note that the inducer in Moleculon taught the 
infringing use with instructions and the only way to form the product is in a 
way that infringes the patent. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668–69 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
 57. Id. at 668–69. 
 58. Id. at 668. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. The court specifically noted that controlling the direct infringer’s 
manufacture of the resins is persuasive evidence that the defendant intended 
GROSS_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 6/6/2013  1:05 PM 
776 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court and found 
that “[t]he requisite intent to induce infringement may be 
inferred from all of the circumstances.”61 
D. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS V. GROKSTER 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., a Supreme 
Court decision, further analyzed the specific intent doctrine for 
inducement, but in a copyright framework. In Grokster, 
copyright holders sued distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing 
computer networking software.62 The Court found that 
evidence of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement, 
such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to 
engage in an infringing use, showed an affirmative intent that 
the product would be used to infringe.63 
Furthermore, the Court found that when an article is good 
for nothing else but infringement, there is no legitimate public 
interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice 
in presuming or imputing intent to infringe.64 Thus, Grokster 
upheld Water Technologies by holding that circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient to prove inducement of infringement.65 
Thus, the Federal Circuit in Water Technologies and the 
Supreme Court in Grokster have affirmed that circumstantial 
evidence may be used to infer intent to induce infringement. 
However, the intent required to prove inducement of 
infringement is different from the intent required to prove 
culpability in other areas of patent law, notably willful 
infringement and inequitable conduct. The intent requirement 
for willful infringement and inequitable conduct are discussed 
infra in Part III.A–B. 
                                                          
to induce infringement. Id. 
 61. Id. at 669. 
 62. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919–
920 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 936. 
 64. Id. at 932. 
 65. Id. at 937 (“The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on  
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to 
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful 
promise.”). 
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III. INTENT IN OTHER AREAS OF PATENT LAW 
A. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT 
Willful infringement is a patent law doctrine where an 
alleged inducer willfully infringes a patent and is one of several 
factors used to determine whether enhanced damages are 
warranted under 35 U.S.C. § 284.66 Willful infringement has an 
intent requirement, which is different than the intent 
requirement for inducement.67 
In In re Seagate Technology, L.L.C., the Federal Circuit 
held that “to establish willful infringement, a patentee must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted 
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions 
constituted infringement of a valid patent.”68 In re Seagate also 
requires an intent prong directed to the state of mind of an 
accused infringer as if the “threshold objective standard is 
satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this 
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in 
the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious 
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”69 
Thus, proving willful infringement requires considering 
the alleged willful infringer’s subjective state of mind or intent. 
Such subjective intent of the defendant was analyzed by the 
Federal Circuit in Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. 
v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.70 
In Transocean, the patented invention involved an 
improved apparatus for conducting offshore drilling.71 The 
defendant, Maersk USA, made a modified rig that it believed 
designed around the patented invention.72 The Federal Circuit 
held that even though Maersk USA knew of the patents, it 
                                                          
 66. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006);  Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 
826–28 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 
1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 67. WordTech Sys. v. Integrated Network Solutions, 609 F.3d 1308, 1316 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he legal standards for willfulness and inducement, such 
as the requisite intent, are not identical.”). 
 68. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“It is 
[a] high risk of harm, objectively assessed, that is the essence of recklessness 
at common law.” (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69 (2006))). 
 69. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 70. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors 
USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1313. 
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showed that it had the intent to avoid infringement by 
designing around the rig, and thus, its actions were not 
willful.73 
B. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
The doctrine of inequitable conduct is a doctrine whereby 
patentees are alleged to have deceived the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), thus leading to a holding 
that a patent is unenforceable.74 To successfully prove 
inequitable conduct, an accused infringer must provide 
evidence that the patent applicant (1) made an affirmative 
misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material 
information, or submitted false material information, and (2) 
did so with the intent to deceive the PTO.75 Thus, inequitable 
conduct has an intent requirement.76 
To show deceptive intent, either direct or circumstantial 
evidence may be used.77 However, “because direct evidence of 
deceptive intent is rarely available, such intent can be inferred 
from indirect and circumstantial evidence.”78 In this context, 
the intent requirement for inequitable conduct is similar to the 
intent requirement for inducement. However, intent in 
inequitable conduct has an additional step; in order to draw an 
inference of intent to deceive the PTO, “the inference must not 
only be based on sufficient evidence and be reasonable in light 
of that evidence, but it must also be the single most reasonable 
inference able to be drawn from the evidence . . . .”79 
Courts have debated whether various inferences are proper 
to be drawn in the inequitable conduct framework. The court in 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 1312–13. 
 74. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 75. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 
1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 79. Id. at 1366–67 (emphasis added) (“Whenever evidence proffered to 
show either materiality or intent is susceptible of multiple reasonable 
inferences, a district court clearly errs in overlooking one inference in favor of 
another equally reasonable inference.” (quoting Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS 
Vision Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). 
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Cancer Research Technology Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. 
held that 
[a] court cannot simply infer that an applicant “should have known” 
the materiality of withheld information and thus intended to deceive 
the PTO because the applicant knew of the information and the 
information is material. A district court must find some other 
evidence that indicates that the applicant appreciated the 
information’s materiality.80 
Other courts have held that “when there are multiple 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive 
cannot be found.” 81 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC INTENT SHOULD  
BE HARMONIZED WITH THE STANDARD FOUND  
IN INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
As discussed in Part III.A–B, the requirement to show 
intent in the inducement framework is different than the intent 
requirement in willful infringement and inequitable conduct. 
Richard Stark and Andrei Harasymiak, in their paper 
Inducement of Patent Infringement: The Intent Standard and 
Circumstantial Evidence of Intent, identify that the inducement 
standard for intent is potentially subject to abuse as the 
inducement statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), has no restriction on 
the degree to which activities can facilitate inducement.82 Mr. 
Stark recommends explicitly requiring objective consideration 
of the strength of a defendant’s noninfringement and validity 
defenses in determining the defendant’s intent, and he 
suggests modifying the intent requirement for inducement to 
parallel that of willful infringement.83 
While Mr. Stark’s recommendation is one approach to 
address the intent requirement for inducement, it is this 
author’s opinion that the intent standard for inducement 
should be equivalent to inequitable conduct, rather than willful 
infringement. This suggestion would harmonize with existing 
cases that use circumstantial evidence to infer specific intent. 84 
                                                          
 80. Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 625 F.3d 724, 733–34 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 81. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290–91 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 82. Stark & Harasymiak, supra note 11, at 112. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco., Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); see also Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325 (Fed. 
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Moreover, in instances where circumstantial evidence is 
relied upon by courts to draw an inference that an alleged 
inducer has the specific intent to induce infringement, the 
following three factors should be considered: (1) nexus; (2) 
control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe. 
These factors should be analyzed because they provide specific 
insight into the state of mind of an alleged inducer. 
A. NEXUS 
Courts should consider the nexus between the 
circumstantial evidence set forth to prove inducement and the 
alleged state of mind of an inducer. In other words, the 
circumstantial evidence provided by the patentee must show 
that the alleged infringer had a direct connection to causing the 
infringement. 
For example, if the evidence includes instructions that 
accompany a product and the instructions explicitly teach 
performing the patented invention, a nexus may be established, 
as a reasonable inference can be drawn that an alleged inducer 
is encouraging a user of the product to perform the instructions 
and, thus, to directly perform the act that infringes the patent. 
However, the instructions must be explicit in order to establish 
a nexus between the instructions and the alleged inducer’s 
state of mind, as the only reasonable reading or interpretation 
of the instructions must be to teach a user to infringe the 
patent. 
This is similar to the discussion in Grokster, in the context 
of contributory infringement, “where an article is good for 
nothing else but infringement, there is no legitimate public 
interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice 
in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.”85 This is also 
similar to the intent requirement in inequitable conduct, as an 
inference of intent to induce infringement should only be drawn 
by a Court if it is the single most reasonable inference that can 
be drawn from the evidence.86 Otherwise, it is impossible to 
                                                          
Cir. 2008); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005). 
 85. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
932 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 86. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 
1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
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impute that an alleged infringer has the requisite state of mind 
to induce direct infringement of a patent. 
Thus, for inducement, if the only reasonable reading of the 
instructions is to teach a user to infringe a patent, it is 
straightforward to establish a nexus between the instructions 
and intent to induce infringement. However, if a reasonable 
reading or interpretation of the instructions is not to teach a 
user to directly infringe the patent, then intent to induce 
infringement should not be able to be inferred simply based 
upon the instructions. 
Courts have held that if the instructions teach 
noninfringing uses of a product, it cannot be reasonably 
inferred that the alleged inducer has the specific intent to 
induce infringement.87 Furthermore, there are various 
situations where it is improper to draw an inference of intent 
simply based upon instructions. For example, when the 
instructions are provided in order to meet certain industry 
standards or industry requirements, then it cannot be 
reasonably inferred that the alleged inducer had the specific 
intent to induce infringement simply by providing the 
instructions. Another situation involves having a third party 
control the content of the allegedly infringing instructions. In 
these instances, courts should consider two additional factors, 
control and evidence of mitigating circumstantial evidence of 
intent not to infringe, when making a determination whether 
an alleged inducer has the requisite state of mind to induce 
infringement. 
B. CONTROL 
To infer the specific intent of an alleged inducer, courts 
should also consider whether the alleged inducer had control 
over the instructions or actions of the direct infringer that 
suggest that the alleged infringer’s state of mind was to 
encourage another to infringe a patented invention. 
                                                          
 87. “Specific intent to cause the acts which constitute infringement cannot 
be inferred from actions that merely make possible both infringing and 
noninfringing activities.” epicRealm, Licensing, L.L.C. v. Autoflex Leasing, 
Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 608, 635 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. 
Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “[I]ntent cannot exist 
where the actions allegedly encouraging infringement could also encourage 
alternative, noninfringing acts.” epicRealm, 492 F. Supp.2d at 635; see also 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Moba v. Diamond Automation, 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Warner-
Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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In Water Technologies, the fact that the alleged inducer 
had control over the instructions was important in inferring 
that the inclusion of those instructions with the product 
evidenced a specific intent to induce infringement.88 
Additionally, the fact that the alleged inducer helped the direct 
infringer make the resins by exerting control over the direct 
infringer’s manufacture of the resins was determined to be 
critical in Water Technologies. 
In contrast, when an alleged inducer does not exercise 
control over the instructions or actions of the direct infringer, 
one cannot simply infer intent based upon the circumstantial 
evidence.89 In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., the 
patent was directed to a plotter system for forming images.90 
Hewlett-Packard accused Bausch & Lomb (B & L) of inducing 
infringement since B & L sold a division to a third party that 
sold wheel plotters.91 The court found that after selling its 
division to a third party, “B & L had no interest in nor control 
over what [the third party] chose to do,” and “any of the 
remaining details of the agreement between B & L and [the 
third party were not] sufficiently probative of intent to induce 
infringement.”92 
Similarly, in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., the 
patent involved lighted shoes having a circuit for causing 
periodic flashing on and off of one or more lights.93 The alleged 
inducer (Voit) entered into a contract with the shoe 
manufacturer to distribute shoes with the VOIT trademark. 
The court found that “nothing in the record indicates that Voit 
exercised any ‘control’ over the accused shoes, other than 
‘inspecting’ samples sent to it,” and thus found no 
inducement.94 
 
                                                          
 88. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco., Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 89. Cf. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. JSP Footwear, Inc., 104 Fed. App’x. 
721, 724 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[C]ontrol may indeed serve as a predicate for 
induced infringement under appropriate circumstances.”); Sensonics, Inc. v. 
Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 90. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1466–67 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 91. Id. at 1467. 
 92. Id. at 1470. 
 93. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994). 
 94. Id. at 1302. 
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Thus, an inference of intent should only be able to be 
drawn when the alleged inducer has control over the 
instructions that are allegedly infringing. If the control 
requirement is obviated, then the intent requirement is washed 
away and inducement becomes a general tort (i.e., a strict 
liability offense) just like direct infringement.95 
For example, an alleged inducer might not have control of 
the instructions as certain instructions might be required for 
various reasons discussed above, such as being provided to 
meet industry standards or to satisfy safety requirements. 
Similarly, instructions might be controlled by a third party 
agency, such as the FDA, which may require that instructions 
and a certain wording of instructions that allegedly teach a 
patent are provided with the product even though the alleged 
inducer would not choose to include these instructions with the 
product, and if possible, would remove the instructions. 
For this reason, courts should consider and weigh whether 
an alleged inducer had control over the instructions submitted 
with a product or whether the alleged inducer had control over 
the actions of the direct infringers as a second factor when 
drawing an inference to determine affirmative intent to induce 
infringement. 
C. MITIGATING EVIDENCE NOT TO INFRINGE 
Courts should also consider mitigating evidence of intent 
not to infringe when determining whether an alleged infringer 
has the specific intent to induce infringement. Evidence that 
the alleged inducer took active steps to avoid infringement is 
important, as this evidence shows that the alleged inducer did 
not have the intent to encourage others to perform acts of direct 
infringement. 
Mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe may include 
trying to remove the allegedly infringing language from the 
instructions or taking various steps to ensure that 
infringement does not occur. Other types of mitigating evidence 
to avoid infringement may include promoting uses of the 
product that do not infringe the patent or explicitly stating that  
 
                                                          
 95. Direct patent infringement is a strict liability offense. See Blair v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) (“[A]n 
infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without 
knowledge of the patent.”); see also Mark A. Lemly, Inducing Patent 
Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 228–31 (2005). 
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the alleged instructions should not be read to perform the acts 
that directly infringe upon the patent. 
Thus, in determining whether an alleged inducer has the 
intent to induce infringement of a patent, courts also should 
weigh evidence of mitigating circumstantial evidence of intent 
not to infringe as a third factor in their analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, in instances where circumstantial evidence is 
relied upon to infer that the alleged inducer has the requisite 
state of mind to induce infringement, courts should weigh three 
factors when drawing an inference of affirmative intent: (1) 
nexus; (2) control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to 
infringe. 
It is up to courts to weigh the circumstantial evidence in 
light of these factors and to determine whether an alleged 
inducer has the specific intent required to encourage others to 
directly infringe upon another’s patent. These factors will guide 
courts in making a proper determination of affirmative intent, 
which does not result in inconsistent results. 
 
